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Commercial banks are important intermediaries of
credit for the commercial and industrial sector. Their
power tofinance commercial and industrial activity, how-
ever, is limited sharply by the restrictions imposed by law
and regulation. In particular, banks are limited in their
ability to hold corporate equity in commercialfirms. The
author argues that these restrictions on banks' commerce
powers likely impair the ability of banks to effectively
intermediate credit, particularlyto riskyfirms. In addition
to a theoreticalpresentation, the paperprovides empirical
evidence consistent with the importance oflender equity
powers.
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The powers of commercial banks in the United States
are circumscribed sharply by law and regulation. The main
source of these restrictions is the Banking Act of 1933
("Glass-Steagall Act"). The act's restrictions on bank
underwriting powers are its best known features. These
restrictions effectively separate investment banking from
commercial banking and limit the ability of banks to
operate mutual funds or issue other asset-backed lia-
bilities.
In addition to the underwriting limitations, however, the
act restricts a bank's ownership of securities for its own
account. Specifically, most banks in the United States
generally may hold only debt securities of other com-
panies, unless otherwise authorized. This has come to
mean that banks may hold only small amounts ofnonfinan-
cial firm equity, and in no case may banks exercise control
over commercial companies. 1 Banks also generally may
not hold the debt and equity simultaneously of a client
commercial firm because of this restriction.2 In general,
therefore, the Banking Act of 1933 confines banks to the
role of portfolio lender, and the ownership of shares in
commercial enterprises by banks is limited severely.
The separation of banking and commerce is a seldom
debated restriction on bank powers. While there has been
much debate in recent years over the investment banking
powers restrictions, removal ofthe commerce restrictions
is considered to be much more difficult politically. The
ownership and control ofcommercial enterprises by banks
raises questions of concentration of economic power. In
addition, in an environment ofunderpriced deposit insur-
ance, it raises importantquestions about propagationofthe
safety net.
This paper argues that there are important arguments in
favor of the removal of the commerce restrictions. In
particular, it is argued that the ability to simultaneously
hold the equity ofand lend to commercial firms is impor-
tant to successful intermediation of risky credits. To the
extentthatbanks are special intermediarieswhosefunction
is not costiessly replaced by other types of firms, the
commerce restrictions may have significant macroeco-
nomic consequences.3 In particular, costs of capital may
Economic Review I Summer 1991behigherandtotal investment lowerthan wouldbe the case
ifbanks were permitted to hold corporate equity.
In subsequent sections of the paper, the theoretical
analysis is developed using asimple theoretical representa-
tion of the firm in the context of information asymmetIy
(For exposition purposes, the analysis abstracts from prob-
lems caused by underpriced deposit insurance.) The paper
goes on to look for data verifYing the theoretical notions.
Direct empirical verification of the effects of expanded
powers hypothesized is difficult because U.S. banking
exists in the context of restricted powers. However, inter-
national comparisons, and scrutiny of the contracting
processes of nonbank U.S. financial intermediaries pro-
vide anecdotal evidence that is generally consistent with
the hypothesized effects. The paper concludes with some
broad policy observations.
I. The Theoretical Advantages ofMixed Finance
In recent years, the finance literature has come to
recognize the importance of information asymmetries in
financial relationships. Ifone party is betterinformed than
another about events affecting the relationship, a financial
relationship may be infeasible or handicapped unless the
contractual agreement controls the ability of one party to
exploit the other.
A primary instance of such a problem can arise in the
context ofa firm and its external financiers. It is probably
reasonable to assume that the insider/management of the
firm knows more than outside financiers about the firm's
projects and prospects. This is likely because it is costly to
make the firm transparent to outside investors, and because
information is fungible, so that its general release would
dissipate rents enjoyed by the firm in its markets. In such
an atmosphere of information asymmetry, there is no
assurance that the self-interested behavior of the firm will
conform to that expected by its outside financiers. The
result may be failure to fund socially desirable activities, or
financial contracts that do not allocate resources optimally.
In the following discussion, we demonstrate formally
that pure debt is not the socially desirable form offinance
under many conditions. Rather, outside financiers may
need to hold some form of equity claim on the firm
simultaneously with the debt claim ifthe firm's value is to
be maximized. We will call this type offinancing "mixed"
financing.
AModel ofthe Financing and
Strategy Choices ofthe Firm
We examine the financing arrangements for a firm that
faces uncertainty about its future payoffs.4 Let P be the
nonnegative payoffs ranging from 0 to m and x be a
parameter representing different "strategies" that indexes
various payoff distributions. Using Lucas/Breeden-type
capital asset pricing, the market value (in a competitive
market) of the firm can be derived from information on
the distribution of payoffs.s As Ross (1987) has shown,
a distribution function f(P,x) can be derived that has
the property
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m
f f(P,x)dP = 1.6
o
Thus the discounted expected value ofthe firm, MV(x)
can be written as
m




MV(x) = - f [1 - F(P,x)]dP,
r 0
where r is the return on a certain payoff (the "risk-free"
return) and F (P,x) is the cumulative distribution associ-
ated withf(P,x).7 We assume that the firm has a maximum
discounted expected value at some strategyx*, and that its
value function is strictly concave in x. In addition, we
assume that the firm borrows in external debt markets an
amount equal to D.
The value of the firm can be partitioned into those
payoffs that accrue to debt holders, B(x), and those that
accrue to equity holders, V(x). Specifically, ifthe coupon
payment on the debt is R, the market value ofthe firm can
be partitioned as
I R
MV(x) = B(x) + Vex) = - f [l - F(P,x)]dP
r 0
I m
+ - f [1 - F(P,x)]dP.
r R
That is, the discounted expected value of the payoffs
between 0 and R accrues to bondholders, while the portion
in excess ofthis accrues to equity holders.
Note thatx indexes not only the firm's value, but also the
"risk" of the strategy. Bankruptcy occurs ifP < R. The
strategyx' will be consideredriskier than x ifthe probabil-
ity ofbankruptcy is greater. That is, ifF (R,x')> F (R,x).
Ifthe distribution function has a single-crossing property,
then this also suggests that whenx' is greaterthan x, x' is a
riskier strategy than x. 8
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The Moral Hazard Problem
Having structured the basic valuation model, we can
now model how information asymmetry can influence the
viability ofexternal finance for this firm. Itis assumed that
only outside financiers hold the debt ofthe firm, and that
outside financiers are informationally handicappedrelative
to the insider/equity holders ofthe firm. This information
asymmetrytakes the form ofuncertaintyaboutthe strategy,
x, that will be chosen by the insiders.
We look first at thecasewhenoutsidefinanciers canonly
hold the debt the firm (and thus the insiders hold all the
equity). For a given coupon, R, on the debt, insiders have
an incentive to chose a riskier strategy than the one
incorporated in R. This is because for x' > x, for a
given coupon
1 m
Vex') = - I [1 - F(P,x')]dP > Vex)
r R
m




B(x') I [1 - F(P,x' )]dP < B(x)
r 0
R
f [1 - F(P,x)]dP,
r 0
by the earlier definition of a riskier strategy. In essence,
riskier strategies add to the "upside" value captured by
equity holders while decreasing the value ofthe positionof
the bondholders (for a given amount ofoutstanding debt).
This implies that aB (x)/ax < O.
The Effect on Risk-Thking
The equilibrium effect of the moral hazard problem on
risk-taking and the value ofthe firm requires consideration
ofhow the parties to the transaction will respond to these
incentives. Since the value of the firm is assumed to be a
concave function of the strategy x, by definition it is
maximized when aMV(x)/Jx = 0, which will occur by
definition at x*. The insider/borrower, however, will have
his equity stake maximized when the first order condition
for a maximum value of V(x) is met. This is when
JV(x) JMV(x) JB(x)
~ = ax -~ =0,
at a given coupon rate, R. But since JB(x)/Jx < 0, the
value of the first-order condition will be zero only for
strategies for which JMV(x)/Jx < O. By the assumed
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concave nature ofthe firm value relationship, this requires
selection of a strategy, x + , that is greater than the value-
maximizing strategy, x*. Thus, the strategy, x+, that
would be chosen by the insider would result in a less than
maximum firm value, and strategies riskier than the value-
maximizing strategy.
A rational lender, ofcourse, will anticipate the tendency
for the insider to take on riskier projects, and will charge a
risk-adjusted bond coupon rate that accommodates this
expectation. Thus, he will charge a risk-adjusted rate
R (x+ ) so that the value ofthe debt'is equal to D, the given
amount of outside debt financing obtained by the firm.
That is, in equilibrium R (x+ ) will be chosen so that
I R(x+)
B(x+) = ~ I [1 - F(P,x+ )]dP = D.
o
This will be a highercoupon than at the value-maximizing
strategy, since for x + > x*,R(x+ ) must be greater than
R (x*) in order to make
R(x+)
I [1 - F(P,x+ )]dP
I R(x*)
- I [1 - F(P,x* )]dP = D.
r
o
In equilibrium, therefore, lenders pricedebtin the above
manner so that its discounted value is always equal to the
amount borrowed, D. As a result, if a strategy, x, is
pursued where x* ~ x < x+, it is immediately im-
plied that
V(x*) = MV(x*) - D;:: Vex) = MV(x) - D> V(x+)
= MV(x+) - D.
That is, the value ofthe insider's equity would be greaterif
the strategy, x, which is less risky than the strategy x+ ,
were employed.
Mechanisms to Control Risk-Taking
Thus, the insider has an incentive to find some way to
persuade outside financiers that the riskiest strategies will
not be pursued. The mechanism could involve, for exam-
ple, covenants in the financial agreement to bind the
insiders' behavior. Covenants that restrict additional bor-
rowing by the firm, or give borrowers seats on boards of
directors (thereby giving them access to inside informa-
tion) may be thought ofin this light.
Alternatively, the outside financiers could be given a
share ofthe equity ofthe firm in return for theirlending the
funds, D. Let us say, for example, that the insiders give
Economic Review / Summer 1991away a portion, t, ofV(x) so that the insider's share is now
(l-t)[MV(x) - B(x)]; O:oS t:oS 1.
The insider will now have to find a strategy, x+ +, to
maximize
aMV(x+ +) aB(x+ +)
(1-t) ax - (1-t) ax = 0,
which will have the same optimum for a given R as before
since it isjusta scalarofthe first orderconditionin the all-
debtfinance case. However, thereaction ofthe bondholders
will change. Sincethey now holdashareoftheequityofthe
firm, everything else being equal, they will require a lower
coupon on competitively priced debt, D.9
It can be shown that the optimal strategy, x+ + , in this
situation will be less risky than the strategy pursued when
only all-debt positions were permitted. That is, x+ + will
be less thanx +. This can be demonstrated by recognizing
that if the new strategy, x+ + , is in fact better for equity
holders than x + , then V(x+ + , R + + ) > V(x + , R+ + ). It
also must be the case that it was not the preferred strategy
when all-debt finance was used. That is, itmust be the case
that V(x+ , R + ) > V(x+ + , R + ). With the knowledge that
R + + is less than R +, these two relationships together
imply that
R+ J [F(P,x + ) - F(p,x+ + )]dP > 0.
R++
This will be the case only ifx + + is a lower risk strategy
than x + .10 Thus, if outside financiers are offered the
opportunity to simultaneouslyholdthe debt andequity ofa
firm, the firm will adopt less risky strategies. These
strategies more nearly maximize the value ofthe firm.
The same result, it should be emphasized, can be
obtained by directly monitoring and controlling the firm's
risk-taking via restrictive covenants, participation inside
the firm, and other techniques. Monitoring efforts are
costly, however, because they involve expenditure of re-
sources by the outside financier, and because they require
the firm to reveal informationthat it mightotherwise prefer
not to circulate outside the firm. If the outside financiers
are given some control over the firm (through seats on
boards ofdirectors, for example), there also may be a cost
burden in the form ofless efficient management (because
the outsiders, by definition, may be less expert in the
business ofthe firm than the firm itself). Whether monitor-
ing andcontrol approaches will be used with (orinsteadof)
mixed financing depends upon the balance ofthe costs and
benefits ofeach approach.
Insummary, however, we have found that, forafirm with
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a given face value of debt, D, and a given distribution of
payoffs, allowing outsiders to simultaneously hold debt
and equity increases net firm value over all-debt finance.
Thus, ifan artificial restriction limits outside financiers to
all-debtclaims, net social value ofthe firm's activities will
be enhanced ifnonzero equity shares are permitted. Since
the moral hazard problem is greatest in the case of a
borrower who has little equity at stake, or whose risk-
taking cannot be controlled or monitored accurately, the
remedy ofmixed financial contracts likely is ofparticular
value in these cases.II
Needless to say, various forms of mixed financing
besides the simple mixed finance form used here can
produce this result. Convertible debt, debtplus warrants or
rights, collateralized lending, and other forms of mixed
debt and equity financial structures are essentially ways of
sharing equity claims with lenders.
The Role ofBanks in Mixed Finance
Thus far, the discussion has emphasized the importance
ofmixed financing generally in the relationship between a
firm and its outside financiers. An obvious question,
however, is whether mixed financing needs to be done by
financial institutions that accept deposits. There would
appear to be a simple answer to this question, one that
relies again on the notion ofasymmetric information.
A bank is distinguished from other intermediaries be-
cause it issues debt, redeemable on demand, that may be
used in lieu of currency to effect household transactions.
The depositors ofa bank thus are holders ofpar-value, de-
mand debt. Because depositors consist ofordinary house-
holds, they may be assumed to beinformationally deprived
relative to the managers of the bank. Thus they, like the
outside financiers of our previous discussion, need to be
able to observe behavior on the part of the bank that is
consistent with control ofrisk-taking. Inessence, this is an
extension of the argument made by Diamond (1984) and
Gorton and Haubrich (1987) that a bankhas an incentive to
structure the portfolio so as to simplify the depositors' own
monitoring problem.
From our earlier analysis, a bank that holds a pure-debt
position in firms has a claim that will be used to finance a
riskier strategy than it would be ifit employed mixed debt
and equity finance. To the extent that suchmixed financing
improves the lender's control over the moral hazard prob-
lem, it is a superior claim to the pure-debt position. It is
likely that depositors, everything else being equal, would
prefer their deposits be invested in such superior claims.
Thus, depositors desiring a risk-free rate of return would
prefer banks with investments structured as mixed finance
21for the same reason that a lender would prefer such an
investment itself.
The Specialness of Banking
This line of reasoning suggests that banks with com-
merce powers would dominate banks restricted to all-debt
financial contracting with loan clients. It does not say,
however, that fully empowered banks necessarily dominate
other types offinancial institutions with the ability to hold
the equity and debt ofa firm. For this to be the case, there
mustbe something"special" about the banking firm in the
first place.
The"specialness" ofa bank can be either on the assets
or liabilities side of its activities. That is, depository
institutions may be special because the provision ofdeposit
services lowers the cost ofaccessing the savings ofcertain
types of individuals in the economy. Households, for
example, may have little in the way ofresources to devote to
financial management. Hence, they may seekdemand debt
as an investment because it offers a bankruptcy covenant
that is inexpensive to exercise (they can just demand
repayment of their debt, without any legal costs), and
demand debt simultaneously provides liquidity and invest-
ment services.
Alternatively, banks may be special because they are
superior monitors ofloan credits. This is an argument that
has been madebyJames (1987) and others. Forthis to be an
advantage ofdepository loan monitors, however, this tech-
nological advantage must flow from some advantage of
jointly providing this service and deposit services. Con-
ceptually, this could be because holding deposit accounts
provides monitoring information about loan clients, or
because banks enjoy scale economies because deposit
liabilities provide a large liability base.
Although economists continue to debate the issue, the
empirical importance of banking in virtually all finan-
cial landscapes strongly suggests that banks play special
roles.l2 By extension, therefore, restricting the equity
powers of commercial banks will have important con-
sequences to the extent the powers restrictions have the
adverse effects modeled above.
Evidence from Venture Financing
Hypotheses 1 and 2 above can be tested by examining
financings that clearly involve risky projects and asym-
Because mixed debt-equity financing by banks is not
permitted in the U.S., however, it is necessary to look to
other financial sectors and other financial systems to see if
these hypothesized effects are observed.
II. Empirical Support
The arguments made in this paper suggest a number of metric information. Mixed debt-equity financing should
testable hypotheses about the use of mixed financing and be prevalent in these types ofcircumstances.
the role ofbanks: The Nature of Venture Activity. An examination of
1. Mixed debt-equity financing will be used when the U.S. venture capital activity helps test these hypotheses.
riskiness ofprojects is difficult for outsiders to monitor The venture capital business in the United States provides
or control. financing in an environment of particularly severe infor-
2. Preference for such financing also will be higher where mation asymmetry on project risk. Venture projects, be-
the equity stake ofthe firm is small or collateral is not cause of their novelty, are risky and difficult to evaluate
available. externally. In addition, venture firms, by definition, are
3. Banks that must hold only debt will be dominated by firms with low collateral and market value net worth.
intermediaries without such restrictions. As acorollary Thus, start-up firms offer little in the way ofreceivables or
ofthis, banks will be more prominent intermediaries in other sources of collateral to protect the financier's posi-
financial systems that grant banks equity powers. tion; and the entrepreneur typically has little equity in the
4. In economies where external finance is handicapped by enterprise to moderate the moral hazard problem faced by
instrumentation powers, there will be greater reliance the lender. As Table 1demonstrates, the result is a class of
on financing generated internally by the firm, despite investments with very high risk, relative to other types of
the inefficiency ofsuch finance. assets in the economy.
The Type of Instrumentation. The type of financial
instrumentation typically employed in the high-risksetting
of venture finance as displayed in Table 2 supports the
theoretical notions offered earlier. l3 As is apparent from
this table, simple coupon debt instruments ("notes" in
Table 2) are very uncommon in venture financing. 14 When
pure debt is used, it is typically very short term, usually to
provide a new firm with interim working capital or other
temporary needs. Consistent with the model above, both
22 Economic Review / Summer1991the monitoring problems and the high risk ofthe projects
predispose against the use ofpure debt.
The most common form of venture finance instrument
appears to be convertible preferred stock, which is essen-
tially a mixed debt-equity position similar to the simpler
equity share modeled above. The preferred stock dimen-
sion gives the venture capitalist some debt-like returns,
while the convertibility feature provides opportunities to
enjoy the greater upside potential ofcommon stock. Less
commonly, straightdebt with equity conversion or detach-
able stock warrant features are employed. These, too, have
elements of a mixed financial structure.
The venture finance positions are augmented by other
covenants that serve the role ofdirectrisk-capping, that is,
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permitting the financier to control his losses should he
perceive a deterioration in his position. The convertible
preferred positions, for example, often include liquidation
priority and redemption rights. Liquidation priority, pro-
vides the venture capitalist with a worst~case downside
protection; redemption rights require that the firm cash out
the venture capitalist at a premium over the value of the
initial investment if, by a certain time, performance has
been less than anticipated. In addition, various antidilution
and stock sale restrictions are frequently imposed to pre-
vent the firm from increasing its leverage or diluting the
claims of the venture capitalist. Table 3 presents the
frequency of such features from a survey of venture
partnerships.
In addition to embedding these control features in their
outside positions, venture capitalists often obtain inside
(management) rights in return for their significant outside
funding. These rights may include the opportunity to
appointone ormore directors orto serve as an officerofthe
company. In addition, financing to venture firms usually is
provided in stages, to give the venture financier additional
control.
Evidence from Recent Changes in
Tax Law and Venture Activity
All of these contracting conventions observed in the
venture capital industry lend further support to the notion
that mixed debt-equity positions are useful in intermediat-
ing these types ofrisky credits. This observation is further
supported by the effect ofrecent changes in tax law on the
23Chart 1
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opportunities to examine the effects of liberal commerce
powers.
Dominance ofBank Intermediaries. In both countries,
commercial banks are the dominant intermediaries. In
sharp contrast to the 0.S., the major share of external
finance is obtained in the form of bank loans, rather than
the direct placement of debt or equity securities. Chart 1
depicts the level and trend ofbank loan share in the 0.S. ,
Japan and Germany.
The pattern of finance in both Germany and Japan
appears to emphasize mixed debt and equity finance.
Unlike banks in the US., banks in both Germany and
Japan hold major equity positions in their corporate credit
clients. In Germany, it is estimated that banks hold be-
tween5 and 10 percentoftotal bankingassets in the form of
corporate equity, or about 10 to 20 percent oftotal corpo-
rate equity in Germany. Complete dataare not available on
the equity positions of German banks. Special antitrust
studies conducted in the 1970s, however, reveal the role of
German banks in large corporations. As Table 4 shows,
German banks have very significant positions in these
companies, with 28 percent of the largest companies
having 10 percent or more of their equity capital held by
financialinstitutions. Commercialbanks appearto use this
practice the most, but a wide variety of universally em-
powered financial institutions hold corporate equity.
In addition to significant equity positions, German
banks obtain additional corporate control capability be-
cause of stock voting practices permitted in Germany. In
level ofventure finance activity. Recent changes in tax law
have increasedeffectivecapitalgains tax rates and increase
the benefits of tax-deductible debt finance. Specifically,
with the passage of the Tax Act of 1986, personal income
tax rates were made lower than the corporate income tax
rate, and the rates at which capital gains and ordinary
income are taxed were equalized. Both have the effect of
favoring debt over equity finance.
In the venture capital industry, this appears to have
resulted in a reduction of venture commitment flows by
about 60 percent, and to have skewed venture finance
activity toward lower-risk, more conventional interme-
diation. ls This recent experience underscores the selective
importance of equity and mixed finance positions in fi-
nancing risky ventures.
Evidence from Other Banking Systems
Hypotheses 3 and4 state, respectively, thatin economies
that do not restrict bank commerce powers, banks will be
the dominant form of intermediation and, by extension,
that external finance thus will be facilitated. Although the
commerce powers ofcommercial banks are limited today
in the United States, banks in some other countries enjoy
greater flexibility in this regard. This permits us to see
whether mixed financing emerges as a common financing
technique in such systems, andhow banks fare versus other
intermediaries when these powers are available.
German and Japanese Banking. Commerce powers
are generally less restricted in most European countries
and in Japan as well. Of the major European countries,
Germany has the most liberal policies regarding com-
binations of banking and commerce. So-called universal
banking is practiced, and banks enjoy virtually complete
flexibility in the relationships that they may have with
commercial firms. 16 These powers are oflong standing in
Germany, having been acquired with the introduction of
joint-stockbanking that occurred in 1848. These so-called
Kreditbanken enjoyed both investment and commercial
banking powers. In addition, historically there have been
no antitrust laws orrestrictions against interlocking direc-
torates in Germany, and banks were permitted, as needed,
to require representationonsupervisory boards ofthe firms
to which they lent funds.
Japanese financial regulation is nominally similarto the
U.S., since restrictions similar to Glass-Steagall were
imposed in the postwar period. In practice, however, as
Kim (1988) has pointed out, the keiretsu industrial rela-
tionships and mochiai cross-shareholding relationships
function to permit considerable exercise ofmixed financ-
ing. Thus, both Germany and Japan offer interesting
24 Economic Review / Summer1991particular, German banks also are the major provider of
stock brokerage and dealing services. As a result, most
shares are held on deposit by banks. German law and
regulation permits the shareholder to delegate voting au-
thority to the bank ofdeposit.
These delegated voting rights add to the ability of
German banks to control risk in the corporations to which
they have lent; in the parlance ofourearliermodel, they are
able to directly limit selection of risky projects through
their corporate affiliations. Referring again to Table 4,90
percent of the large-company sample had 10 percent or
more of their equity voted by banks in 1974175. These
control channels are further implemented through bank
memberships onboards ofdirectors and management com-
mittees ofcommercial firms. A 1979 report by the German
Monopolies Commission, (Bericht der Studiet Kommis-
sion 1979) for example, found that banks had repre-
sentatives on the boards of two-thirds of the top 100
corporations.
For reasons given earlier, we would expect the use of
mixed financing to be less common in the financing of
well-establishedfirms with substantial net worth since they
pose more modest monitoring and control challenges than
new, low-net worth firms. Indeed, over time the amount of
equity held by German banks in large corporations has
declined (Bericht der Studiet Kommission 1979).
Similar patterns of significant stock ownership and
control have been found in Japan in recent decades. As
Table 5 indicates, for example, the six major industrial
keiretsu all have had significant ownership by financial
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institutions. Although banks are nominally limited to 5
percent equity positions in nonbank corporations, through
cross-shareholdings with insurance companies and se-
curities firms, the effective position ofthe main banks of
keiretsu is enlarged considerably.
Alternative Explanations. It could be argued that the
dominance ofbanks in these two countries results not from
more efficient bank intermediation, but from less efficient
direct placement markets. Indeed, German stock and bond
markets in particular are notoriously undeveloped. (The
German stock exchange, for example, is open only 2 hours
25a day for public trading.) Similarly, corporate debt markets
in Japan are said to be poorly developed.
Poorly developed external financial markets however,
would lead us to expectto see relatively greaterreliance on
internal financing. (As Myers and Majluf 1984 have sug-
gested, firms rely on internal finance when information
asymmetriescannotbemanagedby outside intermediation
processes.) Yet in both Germany and Japan, there is less
reliance on internal financing than in the United States,as
illustrated by Chart 2. The comparative reliance of U.S.
firms on internal finance is consistent with the notion that
bank intermediaries are handicapped in their ability to
manage risk in an information-asymmetric environment.
The relatively heavy reliance in the U.S. on a distinct
venture capital industry also suggests that banks may be
handicapped in financing certain types of credits. In es-
sence, in the United States, the venture capital industry or
some institution like it is necessary because ofconstraints
onmixed financing by banks. With no suchconstraints, we
would hypothesize greater bank involvement in venture
capital. Indeed, this appears to be the case in Germany,
where banks provide between 45 and 55 percent of all
venture capital. In fact, similar high percentages are
observed by Oohge, et al. (1989) in all other European
nationswith liberal bankequitypowers, suchas France (35
percent) and Italy (70 percent). The fact that U.S.-style
venture capitalism has had difficulty operating in Japan
also may be consistent with this view.
Chart 2
The Use of External







Evidencefrom U.S. Bank Portfolio Behavior
Theevidence above suggests that the presence or lack of
bank equity powers can have a significant effect on the
structure offinancial intermediation. In particular, banks'
rolein.financial intermediation ofrisky credits is likely to
belesswithoutequity powers. Atissue, however, is notjust
the specific institutional form of financial intermediation,
butrather the efficiency of its provision in the economy.
Portfolio.Effects. To the extent that strip finance by
deposit-taking intermediaries is the most efficient form of
intermediation, ofcourse, the market share implications of
powers restrictions have direct efficiency effects. More-
over, restricting the type of financial contracting that a
bank may use will result in a self-selection ofthe types of
credits able to be served by a bank. This reduces the
diversification opportunities that banks may enjoy, and
with it, the ability to attract (uninsured) depositors.
In the U.S. context, it seems clear that firms with
significant equity and relatively transparent portfolios are
increasingly able to go to investors directly to raise new
funds. Underwriting and information systems clearly have
improved in the computer age. Yet these are precisely the
types ofcredits that banks, undertheircurrentrestrictions,
are best suited to serve. Without the ability to hold corpo-
rate equity, banks cannot reasonably expect to serve effi-
ciently firms with low net worth, low collateral, or novel
and risky projects. There seems no doubt that, in the
United States, the portfolios of commercial banks have
become less diversified, and more dependent upon "mid-
dle market" credits and remaining high collateral credits.
Having lost the short-term corporate debt market to the
commercial paper market in the 1970s, U.S. commercial
banks began losing other lines ofindustrial finance in the
1980s. Call report data reveal that the result has been ade-
cline in the share ofcommercial and industrial loans rela-
tive to total assets. In 1984, for example, C&I loans were
17.5 percent oftotal assets; as ofthe first halfof1990, this
had declined to less than 15 percent. In absolute, inflation-
adjusted terms, lending by U.S. banks to nonfinancial
corporations has declined by two-thirds since 1978.
In place ofC&I lending, banks have increased substan-
tially their holding ofreal estate credits. The share ofreal
estate-collateralized loans in U.S. bank portfolios has
increased from 14 percent in 1984 to about 23 percent
today. In contrast, U.S. Flow of Funds data show that the
flow of directly placed corporate debt has increased 500
percent since 1978, and the real value of venture capital
commitments by a similar amount since 1980. In sharp
contrasttothis experienceofU.S. banks, real banklending
Economic Review / Summer1991to business, in absolute terms has increased in the same
period in both Germany and Japan, according to flow of
funds data from those countries.
Mixed Financing and Corporate Discipline
Anadditional sourceofefficiencyeffects is the possibil-
itythatmixed financing provides asuperiormechanismfor
resolving intracorporate conflicts. In a financial structure
composed of separate debt or equity positions, conflicts
arise during times of financial stress between equity
holders and debt holders. No such conflicts arise, by
definition, in a mixed finance position. Workouts thus may
not need to result in bankruptcy, takeover, or other costly
external control mechanisms.
The data on the incidence of corporate takeovers in
Germany and Japan are consistent with the view that
mixedfinancing affords anopportunityto effectsignificant
corporate change without formal bankruptcy or takeover
and the deadweight costs associated with such processes.
InGermany, forexample, wherethis phenomenonhas been
studied in detail, there has been only one hostile takeover
(the takeover ofFeldmuehle Nobel in 1989 by Flick), and
other types of .•takeovers have been similarly rare, when
cQIUpared tothe U.S. and the U.K. Rather, the banks have
usedtheirstrip financier position to press for management
changes in advance of serious deterioration of the firm's
condition. Similar practices are reported for Japan by
Kim (1988).
III. Concluding Observations
This paper has argued that restrictions on the instrumen-
tation powers ofcommercial banks is a potential handicap
to both the U.S banking industry and to financial inter-
mediation processes in our economy generally. The theory
presented in the paper argues that mixed debt-equity
finance is a potentially important means of resolving the
moral hazard problemthat all outside financiers face. Only
casual data were presented in this paper, but the pattern of
instrumentation is consistent with that implied by the
model presented.
The more difficult issue is whether the lack of instru-
mentation powers ofU.S. banks has any important macro-
economic consequences. For this to be so, one must first
accept the notion that the handicap of limited commerce
powers is significant and, second, that banks have special
capabilities not easily provided by other intermediaries. If
both of these observations are true, then the lack of
universal bank-like powers may result in a handicap to the
overall economy.
In concluding this paper, therefore, it is interesting to
offeradditional, casualobservations. The banking systems
in at least two major economies, Germany and Japan,
follow some variant of mixed finance. In both of these
economies, the introduction of bank equity powers is
associated with their rapid subsequent development.
In the case of Germany, the introduction of universal
banking in 1848 was followed by rapid growth through the
turn ofthe century and the advent ofthe First World War.
Historians and economists such as Riesser, Gerschenkron,
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
and Schumpeter have attributed the rapidity of German
growth in this period in large part to the intermediation
services provided by the Kreditbanken universal banking
system. (See Pozdena and Alexander 1991.) The universal
banking system appears to have served modern Germany
equally well. The German economy has enjoyed higher
average real growth rates than the U.S. in the last three
postwardecades. In addition, spendingon plantandequip-
mentin Germany is roughlytwice as great(as apercentage
ofGNP) in Germany as in the U.S. Nonmilitary research
and development expenditures in Germany also exceed
those in the U.S. by only a slightly smaller fraction.
In Japan, as Hodder, et a1. (1985) point out, the prewar
zaibatsu and direct placement markets had managed to
provide a volume of external financing of only 2 to 4
percentofGNP. In contrast, the World War II and postwar
intermediation by banks is associated with a rate ofexter-
nal finance of as much as 20 percent of GNP. Today,
investmentin plant and equipmentin Japan exceeds that of
theU.S. in absolute terms, and at 23.5 percent ofGNP is
approximately twice the U.S. rate. Research and develop-
ment spending, at3.1 percentinJapan, is 50percenthigher
than in the U.S.17
Obviously, considerableadditional research is needed to
demonstr<ite more robustly the effectsofrestricted banking
commerce powers. In addition, before banks receive addi-
tional powers ofany kind, powers reform must be coordi-
nated with the reform of the deposit insurance system. IS
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This can be written as
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8. The single. crossing property is that F(P,X1) > F(P,x)
for X1 > X. ThiS ensures that a shift in the distribution has
an unambiguous effect on the weight in the tails of the
distribution.
9. That is, the R(x+ +) needed to solve
is lessthan R(x+ ), iftheexpected value ofthe equityshare
is positive.
10. And the two distributions behave so that F(P,x+) >
F(P,x+ +) for all P, the so-called "single crossing prop-
erty" of simple cumulative distributions.
11. The model presented above can be used to show that
bigger coupons (such as might arise as the firm enlarges
the amount of debt, D, it wishes to borrow) induce greater
risk-taking. Thus, the more leveraged a firm becomes, the
greater the moral hazard problem and the potential for a
significant effect of a mixed financing mechanism.
12. See, for example, Black (1985).
13. Venture firms may have other sources of finance as
well, such as funds raised from family or other direct
investor sources. Typically, however, the venture capitalist
is the major source of the funding of start-up industrial
firms. Because such firms usually are closely held, data
are not publicly available to characterize accurately the
liabilities of the typical venture firm.
14. For a more complete description of venture financing
mechanisms, see Testa and King (1989).
15. See Pozdena and Martin (1990).
16. See Pozdena and Alexander (1991), for a more com-
plete description of the institutional features of the Ger-
man banking system. This section draws heavily on that
source.
1. Section 16 of the Banking Act of1933 prohibits national
banks from purchasing corporate stock [12 USC 24], a
prohibition that has been extended to state-chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System
[12 USC 335J. Section 4 ofthe BankHoldingCompanyAct
prohibits a bank holding company (BHC) from owning or
controlling, directly or indirectly, the shares of any com-
pany that is not a bank [12 USC 1843J. The act exempts
investments by BHCs that involve less than 5 percent of
the voting shares of another company [12 USC 1843 (c)
(6)]. In addition, Congress at various times has made
exceptions that permit share ownership in selected or-
ganizations, such as Small Business Investment Corpora-
tion~, which provide a limited form ofdebtfinancing to new
bUSiness ventures [15 USC 682(b)J and state housing
corporations [87 Stat. 269J.
2. The Banking Act does not generate this restriction
specifically. It restricts equity ownership, but generally
allows incidental banking powers related to lending. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has interpreted
this to mean that a bank may take as consideration for a
loan a portion ofthe company's profits orearnings, but not
shares of its stock [12 CFR 7.7312J. The Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System typically has inter-
preted this restriction conservatively as well, and does not
permit a bank to bethe lead lenderto a commercial firm in
which it or other BHC subsidiaries hold shares even if
those shares are nonvoting and thus do not c~nstitute
controlling positions. See Taylor (1987) and Bostrom
(1989) for a further discussion of these issues.
3. The macroeconomic importance of banks as inter-
mediaries is emphasized bya numberof authors studying
the relationship between banking activity and business
activity. See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1989).
4. This section draws very heavily on an approach sug-
gested by Roger Craine, and applied by Craine and
Steigerwald (1989). Craine and Steigerwald's approach
makes very compact a demonstration that otherwise is
quite cumbersome.
5. See, for example, Lucas (1978).
6. This need not bethe underlying payoff distribution; that
will be the case only if agents are risk-neutral.
7. The discounted expected value of the firm is MV(P,x)
= (-1 f'(;Pf(P,x)dP. However, this can be shown to be
equal to (-1f8 [1 - F(P,X)JdP by application ofthe rule of
integration by parts. Specifically, suppressing the x index
for simplicity, let u = [1 - F(P)J and v = P. Then
b b
(-1 f [1 - F(P,x)JdP = (-1 f udv
o 0
b
(-1 uv I ~:'(; - (-1 f vdu
o
28 Economic Review / Summer 199117. Restricted equity powers thus may be at the rootofthe
often lamented high cost of capital in the U.S. Indeed, in
their recent study of Japanese and U.S. costs of capital,
Ando and Auerbach (1990) conclude that the measured
Japanese cost-of-capital advantage may be due to the
"lower risk" of comparable investments in Japan. This is,
of course, simply another way of saying that Japanese
financial intermediation methods better accommodate
risk.
18. It is not clear, however, that expanded commercial
powers necessarily translates into expanded opportuni-
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
ties to exploit the bank safety net. Giving banks additional
tools to manage asset risk should offerthem the opportu-
nityto enhance bank profitability and net worth, which in
turn quells the desire for risk-taking at the expense of the
deposit insurance fund. Even for banks with very low
market value net worth (and, hence, a strong preference
forrisk taking at the expense of the deposit insurer), a
method of controlling the cost of risky credits would be
used positively to enhance net worth.
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